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Chapter Ten

Outer Space Law Principles and Privacy
Frans G. von der Dunk
I. Outer Space Law and Privacy
When the space law era was ushered in during the late 1950s, it was already clear to some
observers that, sooner or later, life on Earth would be monitored from a distance without
those living on it necessarily knowing about it—Big Brother in optima forma.
At the same time, with space activities primarily being undertaken by the two superpowers and their acolytes for military/strategic/political purposes (and secondarily for scientific ones), such concerns largely focused on spying in the context of the Cold War.
Satellites clearly were excellent tools for finding the whereabouts of the opponent’s tanks,
troops, aircraft, warships, and (perhaps) missiles. By extension, satellites could monitor
compliance with international agreements, and try to curb the arms race and/or the potential evolvement thereof into real war.
Obviously, any such satellite data were kept highly secret by the few governments involved in generating them, which meant that details on individual persons or companies
revealed by such data were not accessible to anyone outside of an inner circle of security
experts. Even the extent to which satellite data were able to generate relevant details was,
at least officially, a secret. Rumors consequently abounded that military remote sensing
capabilities would actually allow for the reading of car license plates from space.
This situation started to fundamentally change only when satellite data of very high
resolution became widely accessible, as a consequence of both the waning of the Cold War
and the increased interest and entry of private enterprise in outer space. The resolution of
such very high resolution (VHR) data freely available on the commercial markets has recently dipped below the 0.5 m mark, and continues to evolve “downwards.”
By these tokens, it is clear that satellite data may already interfere, in a number of instances, with issues normally considered under the heading of “privacy.”1 This is even
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truer since the concept is no longer confined to human individuals, but may also apply to
legal persons such as companies.2 “Privacy” here is taken very broadly to mean personal
autonomy and (physical and psychological) integrity, including relevant physical and social identity. Any intrusion in the personal domain, whether actual and physical, or virtual
and psychological, would consequently, in principle, interfere with such a concept.3
The current contribution tries to analyze what international space law, as it stands today, might already provide in terms of relevant rules, rights, and obligations, or at least
legal principles, pertinent to issues of privacy. These issues will, sooner or later, arise in a
more down-to-Earth context.
II. The Outer Space Treaty
The legal situation pertinent to outer space and space activities reflects the focus on state
activities and state interests in the realm of politics (and science). The 1967 Outer Space
Treaty,4 the first global treaty on space activities and the rules relevant thereto, focused on
such state behavior, even as it—being a “Treaty on Principles”—did not provide much detailed guidance on what states precisely were allowed, or not allowed, to do in terms of
military space activities. A few years later, the bilateral superpower ABM Treaty5 specifically referred to the beneficial role of satellites as one form of “national technical means of
verification.”6 The purpose of this was to ascertain whether parties would keep to their
promises in terms of anti-satellite missile deployment—and thereby contribute to the nonviolent stalemate of the Cold War.
The baseline of the general legal framework for outer space activities, which the Outer
Space Treaty provides, concerns the freedom of activities in outer space in conjunction
with the inability of individual states to exercise jurisdiction in outer space on a territorial
basis.7
Consequently, this freedom can only be limited in the first instance by the international
community of states as a whole, essentially through international treaties and/or the establishment of customary international law obligations by means of accumulating state practice and opiniojuris.8 Such limitations need not only stem from specific space treaties or
customary international space law. Notably, Article III of the Outer Space Treaty provides
that general “international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest
of maintaining international peace and security, and promoting international cooperation
and understanding” applies to outer space as well.9
In principle, the aforementioned freedom also includes the right to use outer space for
satellite remote sensing of Earth, or any part thereof, for whatever purpose. Such a freedom
is underpinned by the freedom under general international law “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas,”10 and, more specifically, by the right to conduct space-based
remote sensing activities recognized in the 1986 UN Resolution on remote sensing.11
Of course, seen in contrast to the (quasi-)territorial sovereignty which states are entitled
to exercise over their national airspace,12 and which allows them to prohibit, and even
forcefully preclude, remote sensing from their own airspace,13 such a freedom to conduct
remote sensing from outer space begs the question as to where outer space starts (and airspace ends), vertically speaking.
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For the present purpose, it should suffice to state here that, while a tentative convergence of agreement on a boundary between airspace and outer space in the range of 100
km altitude may be seen to arise, this has not yet reached a status of customary international law.14 The satellites which would currently be at issue in terms of their possible use
for remote sensing, without a doubt, would all be considered to be orbiting in outer space
so as to enjoy the freedoms referred to.
When it comes to any possible further limitations to those freedoms, for example, with
a view to addressing possible privacy concerns, the Outer Space Treaty does not provide
much specific guidance. The clause of Article III referring to general international law has
been mentioned but does not fundamentally change the paradigms much. This is precisely
because, in general international law, the freedom of seeking, receiving, and imparting
information is also a mainstay of the regime.15 Any limitation to such freedoms consequently should be sought primarily at the level of national law of individual states—and
is, by definition, only applicable to national territories and actors with the nationality of
the relevant state.16
The UN Charter,17 the one specific instrument of general international law mentioned
in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, also limits the freedom of state activity in the international arena. It prohibits aggression and the use of force against other states, as well as
other threats to international peace and security,18 gross-scale violations of human rights,19
and requires “obligations of effort” in terms of international cooperation, development,
and the like.20 Furthermore, no general international law agreements or customary international law addressing privacy concerns can be discerned which would then be included
in the Outer Space Treaty’s scope, by virtue of Article III.
As a consequence, the international responsibility which states bear under the Outer
Space Treaty for the legality of their own activities, as well as those qualified as “national
activities in outer space” when “carried on . . . by non-governmental entities”21 does not
result in any fundamental, direct legal prohibition of, or even qualification of, the use of
space for potentially interfering with privacy concerns on Earth.
At the same time, these clauses reflect and respect the sovereignty of individual states
to regulate private space activities, including the right to completely prohibit them—or to
require them to respect certain national laws, such as those protecting the privacy of individual persons or entities. On the other hand, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty expressly requires “the appropriate State” to authorize and continuously supervise such
activities to effectively take care of state responsibility at the international level for such
private activities—as long as they qualify as “national activities in outer space” of the state
in question.22
In other words, with respect to space-generated data and information, privacy is very
much a national matter, to be regulated by domestic laws and regulations, and, by definition, limited in scope ratione geographiae and ratione personae.
III. The Other UN Space Treaties
The Outer Space Treaty, being a framework agreement, essentially covers all of man’s endeavor in this specific realm. More detail is contained and elaborated upon in subsequent
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treaties, equally agreed upon firstly in the bosom of the UN Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), and then ratified by individual states, usually quite
broadly. In order to properly complement the above analysis of the Outer Space Treaty
itself, it is also appropriate to briefly assess those follow-up treaties.
The first of these follow-up agreements is the 1968 Rescue Agreement,23 which essentially elaborates upon Articles V and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. These Articles deal
with the obligations of states vis-à-vis astronauts and spacecraft that inadvertently end up
in their respective jurisdiction or sphere of control. The Rescue Agreement elaborates those
obligations in considerably more detail. It does not, however, include any reference, direct
or indirect, to the current issue of “privacy.” At most, the protection of the privacy of astronauts concerned could be considered to be implied as part of their general rights to be
treated as “envoys of mankind” and to be repatriated as soon and as safely as possible.24
The second such international agreement, the 1972 Liability Convention,25 elaborated
the liabilities which states were subject to when undertaking space activities. These liabilities are further to the generic positing of the concept in Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty. Key to an analysis of the potential relevance of the Liability Convention, in the
context of this chapter, is the concept of “damage” under its terms, as it is the occurrence
of such damage which would trigger the various relevant obligations to compensate such
damage.
The Liability Convention defines such damage as “loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or
juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”26 In particular, the
reference to “property” in combination with the general thrust of the Liability Convention—
which speaks of damage “caused by a space object” and often also of damage “caused to a
space object”27—has led most commentators to conclude that compensable damage is limited (exclusively) to direct, physical damage.28 Damage caused by radio-interference, damage caused by wrongful satellite navigation signals or other forms of non-physical and/or
indirect damage, have generally not been accepted to lead to liability under the Convention.29 Consequently, the majority opinion would also be that “damage” caused by the contents of satellite data, for example, damage caused by an intrusion of privacy, should not
be held compensable under the Liability Convention.30
These assumptions, it should be said, have never been tested in judicial proceedings. In
case a relevant dispute cannot be solved by diplomatic means under the Liability Convention, a Claims Commission is to be installed.31 Only on one occasion have documents referring to such a dispute mentioned the Liability Convention, but ultimately, the dispute
was settled by diplomatic means without actually invoking it.32
Thus, inclusion of privacy-related damage as compensable damage under the Liability
Convention cannot be completely ruled out. The Convention’s clause that allocated “compensation . . . should restore the person . . . , State or international organization on whose
behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not
occurred”33 would not, in itself, exclude any indirect and/or non-physical damage from being compensable under the Convention. The ultimate determination of such inclusion or
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exclusion, therefore, would have to wait either for an authoritative international interpretation of these clauses in one direction or another (presumably through COPUOS), or for
a decision or award of a Claims Commission to be installed for a particular dispute.
The next international space treaty, the 1975 Registration Convention,34 focused on Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and developed a regime of registration of space objects.
Apart from the generic focus of the Convention on enhancing the possibilities of identification of certain space objects, inter alia in case those would be violating international obligations, there is only one clause which appears to be in part relevant for the present
subject. In the context of the obligations to register space objects launched, or intended to
be launched, into outer space, both in a national register and through an international one,
the launching state has to register what the “general function of the space object” will be.35
Although the obligation is almost as vague as it can be, obviously a reference to high-resolution
“remote sensing” or even remote sensing for specific purposes, as a “general function,”
might at least alert anyone concerned with privacy to the existence of another potentially
privacy-infringing satellite. The rather general lack of requirements regarding details and
timeliness of the registration, however, appear to provide loopholes (“as soon as practicable,” “to the greatest extent feasible”36) of such size that this clause is often neglected, and
for that reason alone, is of little practical relevance.37
The final international treaty elaborating certain aspects of the Outer Space Treaty is the
1979 Moon Agreement,38 which expands upon details relating to the moon and celestial
bodies with a view to potential resource exploitation. Thus, it does not provide any clauses
of further relevance for the present topic—unless one would consider the clauses mandating free access to all areas of the moon and the facilities, stations, and installations of others39 as constituting a principled absence of any privacy on the moon. In addition, the
general lack of ratification of the Moon Agreement by space faring nations causes any further analysis to be of fairly limited importance.40
In summary, there is a lack of relevant and precise guidance in the Outer Space Treaty
on issues of privacy related to VHR satellite data, particularly in the area of privacy in its
classical sense, referring to private individuals (and subsidiary legal entities such as companies). The four follow-on treaties on space could be described, at best, as tangentially
relevant in such a context. They confirm that, at the time these major space treaties were
drafted (during the 1960s and 1970s), no serious consideration was given to real privacy
protection.
IV. The UN Principles on Remote Sensing
The final space law document of potential general relevance to the issue of privacy is the
UN Principles on Remote Sensing, accepted by consensus in 1986. Although the Principles
as a Declaration of the UN General Assembly do not constitute binding law, they are generally accepted as having customary legal value.41
From this perspective, it is regrettable that the Principles offer only fairly minimal guidance on the topic of privacy of individual persons and entities. To start with, the Principles
effectively limit themselves in scope of application to remote sensing “for the purpose of
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improving natural resources management, land use and the protection of the environment.”42 This is not normally an area where privacy concerns might be expected. Most
importantly, the Principles are very much focused on state interests. This includes states
interested in conducting remote sensing operations around the world, states interested in
access to data generated with respect to their own respective territories, and the proper
balance between these two sets of interests.43 To the extent that this dichotomy could, perhaps, be viewed as a discussion relating to the “privacy of states,” if the second group of
states were seeking to control the generation and, more importantly, distribution of satellite data regarding their own territory, any outcomes on the proper balance of this, as per
the Resolution, might be of interest to the current debate.
Firstly, the UNGA Resolution 41/65 reiterates some of the general principles of the Outer
Space Treaty in the more specific context of satellite remote sensing. For example, it provides for the obligation that remote sensing activities should be carried out “for the benefit
and in the interests of all countries,”44 “in accordance with international law” (including
once more a reference to the UN Charter)45 and in promotion of international cooperation
in this context.46
Secondly, remote sensing “shall be conducted on the basis of respect for the principle of
full and permanent sovereignty of all States and peoples over their own wealth and natural
resources” and “shall not be conducted in a manner detrimental to the legitimate rights
and interests of the sensed State.”47
It is this last clause which effectively results in a principled protection of “privacy of
states,” but also limits such protection, rather fundamentally, to issues of natural wealth
and resources. The insertion of this clause stemmed from the fear at the time, in particular
among many developing countries, that knowledge on the whereabouts of valuable mineral resources in their territories stemming from satellite remote sensing would almost by
definition only be accessible to (one) developed state(s). They feared this would place developed states in an advantageous position with regard to international negotiations on
the development of such resources. As a consequence, those sensed states tried to establish
a regime for remote sensing which gave them control over such activities. Ideally, under
such a regime, the sensing of the territory of a state by any other state would only be allowed subject to explicit consent of the sensed state. Or, barring realization of such a “prior
consent” requirement, access to the data thus generated would only be made available
(outside the sensing state itself) to the sensed state unless the latter would allow for more
widespread distribution.
The aforementioned clause stipulating respect for the concern of the “privacy of states”
would have to be elaborated by means of more detailed requirements and obligations to
actually give the sensed states what they were looking for—but this never transpired. This
is due to the fact that, in addition to the above, Principle IV also stipulated that such activities had to be conducted in accordance with the “freedom of exploration and use of outer
space” already stipulated by Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, effectively counteracting
any effort to allow a single state to limit such freedoms.48
Even more to the point, Principle XII of UNGA Resolution 41/65 provided neither for a
“prior consent” requirement nor for a “controlled access” requirement; it only provided
that, as for “primary data” and “processed data,” “the sensed State shall have access to
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them on a nondiscriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms,”49 and “shall also have access
to the available analyzed information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the
possession of any State participating in remote sensing activities on the same basis and
terms.”50 The italicized phrasing clarifies that the sensed state effectively does not even
have a “prior right” to data concerning its own territory, let alone semi-exclusive rights,
rights of access for free, or the right to prohibit generation of the data at all.
The only unequivocal exceptions provided by the Resolution itself at the international
level to full discretion of the sensing state to handle data generation and distribution as it
wishes, provided by the Resolution itself at the international level, concerns data which
would be important in the context of “protection of the Earth’s natural environment” or
the “protection of mankind from natural disasters.”51 Even here, there is no preferential or
exclusive position for the sensed state(s) as such. Relevant information should simply be
disclosed; respectively relevant data and information should be transmitted “to States concerned” as promptly as possible, at (presumably) no cost.52
In summary, it would appear that the outcome of any debate on the proper balance
between the interests of the sensing states and those of the sensed states, as outlined in the
Resolution, essentially ignored any such “state privacy” interests. In turn that means that
privacy-like interests at the non-state level, the core theme of this book and chapter, are
even less impacted by the Resolution.
This, consequently, also applies to the implementation of the UN Principles in various
jurisdictions. For instance the United States by means of national legislation,53 and the European Space Agency54 (for example with respect to ERS-1 and ERS-2 in 1991 and to Envisat
in 1998), EUMETSAT55 (in its first version as of 1991), Canada (with respect to Radarsat as
of 1996) and the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) (with its own Satellite
Data Exchange Principles in Support of Global Change Research dated 1991), by means of
various data policies, have indeed implemented the UN Principles in their specific respective contexts, at least to some extent.56
However, nominal reference to the UN Principles and the principle of “non-discriminatory
access for the sensed state” turned out to be scanty in fact; and closer analysis also unveiled
that individual authorities simply interpreted them at their own discretion, without much
coherence or even regard for the original intentions behind the UN Principles and the
aforementioned key principle in particular—and would be doing so even more substantially as time passed by. Hence, it was also obvious that such data policy documents had
little to say regarding privacy issues properly speaking.
It should be added, moreover, that only recently has satellite remote sensing data
reached such levels of resolution that “true” privacy issues become involved. Consequently, documents predating that development will certainly not have had any reason to
address privacy in the context of remote sensing, and even those of later dates would effectively, at best, reference existing privacy laws which remain applicable, without addressing in any detail the specifics that space data may bring with them from this
perspective. In any event, whatever implementation took place of the UN Principles regarding “access on a nondiscriminatory basis,” specifically for a “sensed state” regarding
data on its territory or in general terms, is of very little help or guidance here: it could
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hardly serve as a possible model or precedent to handle the true privacy issues on the
international level.
V. Concluding Remarks
Relevant international space law—essentially the Outer Space Treaty, its follow-on treaties
developed through COPUOS, and the UNGA Resolution 41/65, containing the Principles
on Remote Sensing—currently does not provide for any limitations to, or conditions upon,
the generation and distribution of satellite data, including VHR satellite data, specifically
addressing possible privacy concerns of individuals (or companies). Partly as a consequence thereof, the data policies developed by key remote sensing satellite operators similarly do not pay any attention to privacy issues so as to serve as a blueprint for an
appropriate legal regime.
Any possibilities for such individuals to defend their interests in upholding privacy are
consequently to be found only at national level—and, therefore, are limited in scope to the
jurisdiction of the particular state(s) concerned, in terms of territorial and personal jurisdiction. No international regime has yet emerged whereby the privacy protection afforded
by one national legal regime to a specific individual would be generally recognized. This
has occurred by contrast, for example, in the case of international treaties recognizing and
applying patent or copyright protection granted by one state party to other states parties.
Until that occurs, such an individual might only be able to protect his/her privacy in his/her
direct environment, in their own state of citizenship and/or residence. A problem with this
is that satellite data is very often generated and distributed outside of that environment.
Thus, there arises an imbalance between, on the one hand, cosmic generation and principled global availability of VHR data, and, on the other, localized privacy concerns and
national means of protecting them. It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent this
imbalance will be broadly considered as justifying and requiring international measures
such as treaties recognizing privacy rights at a fundamentally international level—it may
well be that Big Brother will remain with us for some time to come.
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averted by relevant warnings; see further, e.g., W. C. Nicholson, Legal Issues: Warning Systems,
Public Entity Risk Institute (2005), available at https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/component/
option,com_bookmarks/Itemid,99999999/catid,-1/navstart,0/task,detail/mode,3/id,756/searchl/.
31. See Art. XIV–XX, Liability Convention.
32. This concerned the Cosmos 954-incident, of a Soviet nuclear powered satellite disintegrating
over a stretch of uninhabited Canadian territory in 1978, where the Canadian statement of claim
referred to the Liability Convention (see Statement of Claim by Canada, Space Law—Basic Legal
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Documents, A.IX.2.2) but the final settlement document did not (see Protocol Between the government of Canada and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 2 April
1981; Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, A.IX.2.2) as the Soviet Union agreed to pay compensation of some 3 million Canadian dollars only ex gratia. See further, e.g., B. A. Hurwitz, “Reflections on the Cosmos 954 Incident,” in Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space (1990), 350–53; C. Q. Christol, “International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects,” 74 American Journal of International Law (1980), 346–47.
33. Art. XII, Liability Convention (emphasis added).
34. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter, Registration Convention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15;
TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975).
35. Art. IV(1)(e), Registration Convention.
36. Art. IV(1), (3), Registration Convention.
37. Cf., e.g., Y. Lee, “Registration of space objects; ESA member states’ practice,” 22 Space Policy
(2006), 44.
38. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter
Moon Agreement), New York, done 18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984; 1363
UNTS 3; ATS 1986 No. 14; 18 ILM 1434 (1979).
39. Cf. Art. 9(2), 15, Moon Agreement.
40. The Moon Agreement at the date of writing has thirteen states parties, none of which are major
spacefaring nations, plus four states (including France and India) having signed the treaty long
ago but never taken the steps to ratify; see http://www.unoosa.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do. Also, e.g., J. I. Gabrynowicz, “Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the
Era of Globalization,” 37 Suffolk University Law Review (2004), 1046.
41. See, e.g., P. Gaudrat and P. H. Tuinder, “The Legal Status of Remote Sensing Data: Issues of
Access and Distribution,” in G. Lafferranderie (Ed.), Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 Years
(1997), 353; M. Ferrazzani, “The Status of Satellite Remote Sensing in International Treaties,” in
K. H. Böckstiegel (Ed.), ‘Project 2001’—Legal Framework for the Commercial Use of Outer Space
(2002), 182.
42. Princ. I(a), UNGA Resolution 41/65.
43. See, e.g., H. A. Wassenbergh, Principles of Outer Space Law in Hindsight (1991), 88–90; G. Catalano
Sgrosso, “International Legal Framework of Remote Sensing,” in Legal Framework for Commercial
Remote Sensing Activities (1998), 5–6.
44. Princ. II, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
45. Princ. III, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
46. See Princ. V, UNGA Resolution 41/65, which furthermore requires states to make available opportunities for participation in their own remote sensing activities to other states “on equitable
and mutually acceptable terms.”
47. Princ. IV, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
48. Princ. IV, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
49. Emphasis added. “Primary data” are defined as “raw data that are acquired by remote sensors
borne by a space object and that are transmitted or delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in the form of electromagnetic signals, by photographic film, magnetic tape or any other
means,” “processed data” as “products resulting from the processing of the primary data,
needed to make such data usable”; Princ. I, resp. (b) and (c), UNGA Resolution 41/65.
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50. “Analyzed information” is defined as “information resulting from the interpretation of processed data, inputs of data and knowledge from other sources”; Princ. I(d), UNGA Resolution
41/65.
51. Princ. X, resp. XI, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
52. Princ. X, XI, UNGA Resolution 41/65.
53. Notably, this concerns the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act, Public Law 98-365,
98th Congress, H.R. 5155, 17July1984; 98 Stat. 451; Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, E.III.4; and
the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Public Law 102-555, 102nd Congress, H.R. 6133, 28 October
1992; 15 U.S.C. 5601; 106 Stat. 4163.
54. ESA was established by means of the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space
Agency, Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 14 ILM 864 (1975); Space
Law—Basic Legal Documents, C.I.1.
55. EUMETSAT was established by means of the Convention for the Establishment of a European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), Geneva, done 24
May 1983, entered into force 19 June 1986; as amended 14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July
1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, C.III.1; 44 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und
Weltraumrecht 68 (1995).
56. For a more extended analysis of the data policy documents referred to already, see the author’s
“Non-discriminatory data dissemination in practice:’ in R. Harris (ed.), Earth Observation Data
Policy and Europe (2002), 43–48; for the two US acts, look briefly at the author’s paper “Private
Enterprise and Public Interest in the European ‘Spacescape’” (1998) 127.
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